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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
 
Nick Coons; et al., 
 Plaintiffs, 
 vs. 
Timothy Geithner; et al., 
 Defendants 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS 
 
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO TREAT 
THE MOTION TO DISMISSAS A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
 
Defendants moved to dismiss this case in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction on 
May 31, 2011.  That motion remains pending.  If this Court grants it in full, this case will 
never reach the merits, and motions for summary judgment would be unnecessary.  On 
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the other hand, if this Court were to deny the motion to dismiss, defendants would seek 
jurisdictional discovery.  Either way, then, considerations of judicial economy and 
efficiency strongly suggest that motions for summary judgment should be filed only after 
this Court decides the motion to dismiss. 
Nevertheless, instead of waiting for this Court to resolve the threshold 
jurisdictional issues presented in the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have moved for 
summary judgment.  And they have asked this Court to convert defendants’ pending 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.  As explained in more detail 
below, this Court should stay plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment pending its 
decision on the motion to dismiss and, if this Court denies the motion to dismiss, pending 
the completion of any discovery.  And it should deny plaintiffs’ motion to convert the 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.    
BACKGROUND 
 On August 8, 2010, plaintiffs—Nick Coons, U.S. Representatives Trent Franks, 
Jeff Flake, and John Shadegg, and more than two dozen Arizona state legislators—sued 
defendants Timothy Geithner, Kathleen Sebelius, Eric Holder, and Barack Obama.  
Compl., ECF No. 1.  More than three months later (nearly eight months after the 
Affordable Care Act was passed), plaintiffs sought an emergency preliminary injunction 
from this Court declaring a provision of the ACA unconstitutional.  Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. 
Inj., ECF No. 26.  On March 8, 2011, nearly two months after briefing was completed, 
plaintiffs decided to withdraw the motion for a preliminary injunction.  Pls.’ Mot. to 
Case 2:10-cv-01714-GMS   Document 55    Filed 06/23/11   Page 2 of 11
 3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
 
 
 
Withdraw Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 33.  An amended complaint, which dropped the state 
legislators from the case, followed three days later.  Am. Compl., ECF No. 35.   
Defendants then moved to dismiss on April 18, 2011.  Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 
38.  Instead of responding to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs amended their complaint 
again on May 10, more than eight months after the lawsuit was originally filed, adding a 
new plaintiff.  Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 41.  Defendants filed a renewed motion to 
dismiss the third version of the complaint on May 31.  Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 
42.  On June 20, instead of simply opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs, citing the 
need to “conserv[e] judicial and the parties’ resources,” (1) responded to defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, (2) moved for summary judgment, and (3) moved under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(d) to convert defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment.  ECF Nos. 48-50.  Defendants’ reply in support of the motion to 
dismiss is due on July 5.  See Order, Mar. 17, 2011, ECF No. 37.   Absent a stay, 
defendants’ opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment would be due on July 
20.  See Local Rule 56.1(d). 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has inherent authority to “control the disposition of the causes on its 
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. 
N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).  As explained below, the fundamental 
jurisdictional issues that defendants have raised in their motion to dismiss, as well as 
interests of efficiency and judicial economy, make it appropriate for the Court to resolve 
defendants’ motion to dismiss before beginning proceedings on plaintiffs’ motion for 
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summary judgment.1
 First, defendants have challenged every count of plaintiffs’ complaint on threshold 
jurisdictional grounds.  These questions must be resolved before any proceedings on the 
merits.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Jurisdiction is power to declare 
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of 
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)); Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2010) (“After 
Steel Co., a court cannot . . . address the merits of a case without ensuring it has 
jurisdiction over the case.”).  A decision in defendants’ favor on the motion to dismiss 
would therefore render moot plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment or, at a minimum, 
focus any remaining issues.  Because defendants’ motion has requested relief that would 
put an end to the litigation, requiring the parties and the Court to address plaintiffs’ 
summary judgment motion at this time, including preparation of opposition papers and 
argument, would result in a waste of the Court’s and the parties’ resources.  
  
For this and related reasons, courts routinely defer consideration of motions for 
summary judgment while dispositive motions to dismiss remain pending.  See, e.g., Ticor 
Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F. Supp. 747, 749 n.2 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding in abeyance 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment “pending resolution of threshold questions of 
                                                          
1  Although defendants were aware of the possibility that plaintiffs would file a motion 
for summary judgment, defendants expressly stated in their March 16 motion to set a 
briefing schedule that “it is possible defendants will move to stay proceedings on the 
summary judgment motion pending this Court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss.”  
Defs.’ Mot. to Set Briefing Schedule 2 n.1, ECF No. 36. 
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jurisdiction and justiciability”); see also, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 
216 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that district court stayed defendant’s summary judgment 
response pending ruling on motion to dismiss); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. Salazar, No. 08-CV-659-bbc, 2009 WL 2029790, 
at *1 (W.D. Wis. July 8, 2009) (noting that briefing on plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment had been stayed pending resolution of defendants’ motion to dismiss); Hill v. 
Chalanor, No. 9:06-CV-438, 2008 WL 907363, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) 
(“[S]uch a decision makes sense because, if the Court were to grant Defendants’ renewed 
motion to dismiss, [it] would moot Plaintiff’s renewed motion for summary judgment.”); 
Ramirez v. Meli, No. 04-C-0786-C, 2005 WL 984365, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 27, 2005) 
(“[U]ntil this court determines whether the claims raised in plaintiff’s motion for partial 
summary judgment will survive defendants’ motion to dismiss, it is reasonable to stay 
briefing on the motion.”); Hamrick v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-4202, 2004 
WL 723649, at *1 (D. Kan. March 11, 2004) (“[I]t is in the interest of judicial economy 
to defer briefing and determination of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion until such 
time as the Court determines the jurisdictional issue raised in the motions to dismiss.”).   
Courts have done the same in Affordable Care Act cases.  See, e.g., Order Re: Stay 
of Briefing on Mot. for Summ. J., Bellow v. HHS, No. 1:10-cv-00165 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 
2011), ECF No. 20 (“Before this Court can exercise any authority to rule on the 
plaintiff’s request for judgment, it is logical that the Court must resolve the issues 
presented in the motion to dismiss and determine whether the plaintiff has standing to 
bring suit in this federal court in the first place and whether this Court consequently has 
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jurisdiction over the proceeding.”); Mem. Op., Mead v. Holder, No. 10-00950-GK, 
(D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2010), ECF No. 20 (“There can be no question that it is more logical and 
efficient for the Court to rule on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss before ruling on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. If the Court has no jurisdiction, then it would 
be a waste of everyone’s time and resources to have concurrent briefing on both 
Motions.”).  Indeed, even in Virginia and Florida, upon which plaintiffs rely upon 
heavily, summary judgment motions were filed only after those courts had ruled on 
motions to dismiss. 
 Second, if this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction and denies the motion to 
dismiss, defendants will wish to seek jurisdictional discovery.  Plaintiff Coons, for 
example, says that he “wish[es] to spend [his] financial resources for at least the next ten 
years on growing [his] small business,” that the minimum coverage provision will require 
him to purchase insurance “which exceeds coverage that [he] need[s] and requires [him] 
to pay for services [he] may never use,” and that he does “not otherwise qualify for 
exemption or waiver from the” minimum coverage provision.  Coons Decl. at 2-3, ECF 
No. 50-1.  But Coons provides no specific facts to support these vague and conclusory 
assertions.  Without any specific facts—such as the nature of Coons’ current 
employment, a description of his “financial resources,” and his income and expenses—it 
is impossible to determine whether Coons will actually be subject to the minimum 
coverage provision when it takes effect in 2014.   
Plaintiffs’ approach of placing summary judgment before a motion to dismiss 
would therefore skew the course of this litigation in inappropriate ways.  Rather than 
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having the Court rule on defendants’ motion to dismiss, which would eliminate (or at a 
minimum narrow) the issues remaining in the litigation, defendants are forced to decide, 
at the present, whether they are able to respond to plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment or whether additional facts to be elicited through jurisdictional discovery are 
necessary to respond to that motion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).  Defendants, of course, 
believe that the second amended complaint is subject to dismissal on its face for the 
reasons stated in their motion to dismiss.  But defendants should not at this time be forced 
to choose between undertaking discovery that will prove to be unnecessary if the Court 
grants their motion to dismiss and relinquishing any ability to take discovery in the event 
the Court does not entirely dismiss the Complaint.  Thus, requiring defendants to respond 
to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment before the Court has ruled on defendants’ 
motion to dismiss would result in significant prejudice to defendants.  On the other hand, 
deferring litigation of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment until after a ruling on 
defendants’ motion to dismiss would not prejudice plaintiffs, particularly because the 
protracted delays and the need for repeated filings in this litigation have been of 
plaintiffs’ own making.2
 This Court should also deny plaintiffs’ motion to convert defendants’ motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiffs object to consideration on a 
motion to dismiss of “numerous publications and surveys containing argument, opinion 
and purported statistics.”  Pls.’ Mot. to Treat Mot. to Dismiss as Mot. for Summ. J. 2, 
 
                                                          
2  If briefing were to proceed on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, defendants 
would likely need to seek an enlargement of the page limits and respectfully reserve the 
right to request such an enlargement.  
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ECF No. 48.  But it is uncontroversial that this Court may take judicial notice of matters 
in the public record—such as the documents cited in defendants’ motion to dismiss—
without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.  See Daniels-
Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourts ruling on 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss may take into consideration ‘matters of which a court may 
take judicial notice’”) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 
322 (2007)); see also Coit v. Biltmore Bank, No. CV-10-0382, 2010 WL 2036563, at *1 
(D. Ariz. May 19, 2010) (“[M]atters of public record are the proper subject of judicial 
notice.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 
1305, 1312 (4th Cir. 1995) (“For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the legislative history of an 
ordinance is not a matter beyond the pleadings but is an adjunct to the ordinance which 
may be considered by the court as a matter of law.”), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 517 U.S. 1206 (1996) (mem.).   
Indeed, plaintiffs’ own cases confirm this point.  See Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. 
Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Defendants contend the district court 
abused its discretion in striking their exhibits because the exhibits were either referenced 
in the complaint, or judicially noticeable.  Defendants appear correct . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Kanelos v. County of Mohave, 2011 WL 587203, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2011) 
(Snow, J.) (“The Court may, however, consider documents that are attached to the 
relevant pleading as exhibits or are ‘referenced extensively’ in the pleading and 
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‘accepted by all parties as authentic.’”) (emphasis added).3
CONCLUSION 
 
 Whatever the result on defendants’ motion to dismiss, judicial economy would be 
served by staying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  Defendants therefore 
respectfully request such a stay pending a decision on the motion to dismiss and, if this 
Court denies the motion to dismiss, pending the completion of any discovery.  
Defendants also respectfully request that the Court deny plaintiffs’ motion to convert the 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 
DATED:  June 23, 2011    Respectfully submitted,    
     
       TONY WEST 
Assistant Attorney General 
 
IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
 
DENNIS K. BURKE 
United States Attorney, District of 
Arizona 
 
JENNIFER RICKETTS 
Director 
 
SHEILA LIEBER 
Deputy Director 
                                                          
3  Plaintiffs may take issue with the statistics and arguments contained within the 
documents that defendants cite, but this is irrelevant.  “[C]ourts are not to scrutinize 
Congress’s conclusions closely[]” but instead determine whether Congress had a 
“rational basis” for determining that the regulated activities “taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce . . . .”  United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 
1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  The documents 
cited by defendants establish that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the 
practice of obtaining health care without paying for it substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  It is therefore the existence of the documents themselves that matters for 
purposes of the Commerce Clause analysis.  Cf. Lazy Y Ranch, 546 F.3d at 588 
(suggesting that consideration of extraneous materials was proper “because [defendants] 
do not offer the extraneous documents for their truth, but to show their articulated 
rationales for denying Lazy Y the leases”).  As plaintiffs do not contend that the 
documents are inauthentic, the documents may be considered on a motion to dismiss. 
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s/ Ethan P. Davis_____________ 
TAMRA T. MOORE 
ETHAN P. DAVIS 
Trial Attorneys 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
Phone: (202) 514-9242 
Fax: (202) 616-8470 
E-mail: Ethan.P.Davis@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that on June 23, 2011, I electronically transmitted the attached 
document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF system for filing and transmittal of a 
Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: 
 Clint D. Bolick, Goldwater Institute, cbolick@goldwaterinstitute.org 
 Diane S. Cohen, Goldwater Institute, dcohen@goldwaterinstitute.org 
Nicholas C. Dranias, Goldwater Institute, ndranias@goldwaterinstitute.org 
 
      s/ Ethan P. Davis 
      ETHAN P. DAVIS 
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